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In May 2014 the Thai army sized power from the elected government led 
by Yingluck Shinawatra. The military coup promised to restore peace and 
harmony in the country and to allow political elections within one or two 
years. However, in 2018 Thailand was still under military rule and 
elections were expected only for early 2019. Before returning the power to 
a civilian government, the army tried to complete a comprehensive reform 
of Thai politics and economy – enforcing a new constitution, creating new 
parties, promoting a long-term economic strategy. These reforms had the 
objective to allow pro-junta political forces to win elections or, in any case, 
to constraint the action of future governments. Two initiatives in the 
economic sphere where expected to create consensus for the junta-
sponsored political party: the launch of the Eastern Economic Corridor, 
promoting infrastructural development in the national key industrial area 
in order to increase FDI attraction; and the adhesion of Thailand to the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (the trade 
agreement that replaced the TPP after the US pull-out).  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Thailand was seldom in the international news in 2018. The exception 
was the story of the boys and their football coach trapped in the Tham 
Luang caves in late June and then saved after a complex rescue operation. 
Nevertheless, this was an important year for the country as significant 
measures were adopted meant to influence the country political and 
economic life in the years ahead. The military junta who had seized power 
in May 2014 finally took concrete steps towards general elections at the 
beginning of the following year. However, the transition year was used to 
complete the reforms of the legal framework – electoral law, electoral 
districts revision, etc. – while a new pro-junta political party was created to 
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help the army to retain power after the elections. Furthermore, the military 
government adopted a long-term economic strategy that was legally 
binding for future administrations. Subtler, but equally important, was 
another step adopted by the junta: the promotion of a discourse for which 
good governance was not connected to a democratic process but on the 
contrary was guaranteed by righteous people that were above the inherently 
corrupted political life.  
 
  
2. A transition year in Thai politics – the military junta prepares for 
political elections 
 
In May 2014 a military coup seized power in the name of ‘peace’ and 
‘political reconciliation’, promising to return the government to civilian 
rule within a couple of years. The date for the new political elections, 
however, was repeatedly postponed.1 Eventually it was set for 24 March 
2019,2 after almost 5 years of military rule. While military dictatorships had 
been quite widespread in different regions in past decades, Thailand 
became conspicuous since 2014 as the only country in which democracy 
had been officially suspended. The Thai case could be put in perspective as 
part of a wider democratic regression but still remained noticeable as an 
isolated case in which the authoritarian regime was imposed by the army 
through the use of force.3 The military rule since 2014 also stands apart 
from the coup of September 2006. In that case, the aim of the military 
intervention was to remove from government Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra and new democratic elections were held in little over one year 
(and Thaksin’s party won again). The coup of May 2014 had a more 
comprehensive objective, besides seizing the power from the Prime 
Minister Yingluck Shinawatra (Thaksin’s sister): it aimed at re-engineering 
Thai political life for the years to come. The army (and likely the palace) 
had the ambition to create new conditions – a new constitution, a new 
electoral system, new political parties – to put to an end the dominant 
influence exerted by Thaksin and his allies on Thai politics. It was this 
complex ambition to motivate Prayuth Chan-ocha, the leader of the military 
junta and self-imposed Prime Minister, to suppress democratic institutions 
for an extended period of time. The year 2018 was a phase in which the 
                                                             
1 ‘Abhisit, academics criticise «risky» new election delay’, The Nation, 9 October 
2017. 
2 ‘It’s Official: Thailand Has an Election Date’, The Diplomat, 24 January 2019. 
3 ‘I can be it all’: Thailand awaits elections but will Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-
ocha be willing to cede power?’, South China Morning Post, 16 January 2018. 
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military junta tried to complete the institutional and political transformation 
of the Kingdom.  
 At the end of January 2018 Prime Minister Prayuth explained that he 
needed more time in office to prepare the country for a general election. 
The worlds he used were revealing: «Please give me some time to lay the 
foundation for the country, that's all».4 The justification for continuing 
postponing the return to the polls was the need to complete the procedures 
to the application elections law, whose enforcement had been suspended 
by the military-appointed parliamentary assembly few days earlier for 
further three months. The real motivation, however was the work still do 
be done to increase the likelihood that Prayuth himself or one of his allies 
could continue ruling the country after the elections. 
 
 
2.1. The new constitutional system and a new authoritarian 
consensus 
 
 The first objective to be reached by the military junta was the 
adoption of a new constitution leading the country towards a «guided 
democracy» framework in which the Army, together with the King, could 
maintain control over key leverages. A drastic constitutional reform was 
considered to be necessary to put to an end almost two decades of radical 
confrontation that had threatened to undermine the political and economic 
interests of the traditional national elites organised around the «network 
monarchy».5 The Army determination to use its strength to reengineer 
political life also through constitutional reforms was not a novelty in Thai 
history.6 The need of a far-reaching intervention was justified in the eyes 
of the junta and its allies by the failure of repeated attempts to oppose a 
popular political movement perceived as an anti-systemic force. 
A democratic constitution had been adopted in 1997 immediately 
before the regional economic crisis severely hit the Kingdom. The rationale 
was to reduce the traditional fragmentation of the Thai Parliament, which 
systematically resulted in less than transparent post-election deals among 
                                                             
4 ‘Thailand's PM Prayut Chan-o-cha says he needs more time in office to prepare 
for election’, The Straits Time, 30 January 2018. 
5 The so-called network monarchy refers to the complex web of relations and 
interests linking the Palace to the Army and to powerful economic elites. The definition 
is based on the pioneering Duncan McCargo, ‘Network Monarchy and Legitimacy Crises 
in Thailand’, The Pacific Review, Vol. 18, Issue 4, December 2005. 
6 Federico Ferrara, The Political Development of Modern Thailand, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015. 
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political groups and lobbies.7 The 1997 constitution allowed the creation of 
stronger political parties and in the aftermath of the regional economic 
crisis facilitated the rise of a new leadership impersonated by the media 
tycoon Thaksin Shinawatra.8 His Thai Rak Thai party won elections in 
2001 on the basis of a progressive populist agenda that found a strong 
consensus among the poor, especially in the North of the country. Thaksin 
was a successful entrepreneur and former police officer from a wealthy 
family background. However, he represented a challenge to the traditional 
national elites and the power network connected to the monarchy. In new 
general elections in February 2005 the Thai Rak Thai further increased its 
popular support, obtaining 374 of 500 seats in the lower house of the 
Parliament with a programme promoting debt relief for poor farmers and a 
universal healthcare scheme.9 After the elections, however, a strong 
opposition mounted against Thaksin: the accusations ranged from 
corruption and conflicts of interests, to human rights abuses (for extra 
judiciary killing of drug dealers), to authoritarian control of the media. To 
contest Thaksin was a spurious coalition of forces – eventually named 
People’s Alliance for Democracy and more commonly known as Yellow 
Shirts – led by a media mogul who was a former allied of the Prime 
Minister and included representatives of the Bangkok bourgeoise, human 
rights groups, royalists, and intellectuals.10 Under pressure from the Yellow 
Shirts and conservative forces connected with the Palace, Thaksin decided 
to call for new elections in 2006 to prove he still had a majority consensus 
in the country. However, in September 2006 his government was deposed 
by a coup d’état while Thaksin was attending a UN meeting in New York.11 
The 1997 Constitution was abrogated and eventually a new one was 
adopted, which reduced the power of government and parliament while 
strengthening the role of the bureaucracy and legal institutions (Supreme 
Court, Constitution Court, Electoral Commission, etc.) directly responding 
to the Monarchy. The elected Senate was replaced by an appointed one and 
the electoral system was changed. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court 
dissolved the Thai Rak Thai and banned 111 of its members to participate 
in new elections for the next 5 years.12 Crucially, however, all these changes 
                                                             
7 Thanet Aphornsuvan, ‘The Search for Order: Constitutions and Human Rights 
in Thai Political History’, Faculty of Liberal Arts, Thammasat University, 2001. 
8 Kevin Hewison, ‘Thaksin Shinawatra and the reshaping of Thai politics”, 
Contemporary Politics, Vol. 16, Issue 2, 2010. 
9 ‘The rise and rise of Thaksin’, BBC News, 7 February 2005. 
10 Seth Mydans, ‘Power of the People Fights Democracy in Thai Protests’, The 
New York Times, 11 September 2008. 
11 ‘With Premier at UN, Thai Military Stages Coup’, The New York Times, 22 
September 2006. 
12 Federico Ferrara, The Political Development of Modern Thailand, p. 239. 
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did not prevent Thaksin to continue dominating the Kingdom’s political 
life. Once the military junta allowed new elections to be held in December 
2007, Thaksin allies regrouped in the proxy People’s Power Party and won 
again.13  
The events of 2006-2007 demonstrated that the Army had wasted a 
coup and the lesson was learned by the military putschists in 2014. After 
the 2007 election the political crisis became even more intricate. A new 
government formed by the PPP faced heated street protests organized by 
the conservative and royalist «yellow shirts» – which went so far to occupy 
the government offices and Bangkok international airport. Eventually, in 
December 2008 a «white coup» operated by the Constitutional Court 
dissolved the PPP and stripped many of its leaders of political rights for 
five years (including the Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat, Thaksin’s 
brother-in-law),14 repeating what done to the TRT two years earlier. With 
many MPs removed from their seats, the leader of the opposition Democrat 
Party, Abhisit Vejjajiva, was able to form a new government.15  
The overturning of the electoral results through the creation of the 
new Abhisit government further ignited the political tensions.16 In April 
2008 the pro-Thaksin Red Shirts movement launched large demonstrations 
asking for the resignation of the unelected government. The Red Shirts also 
supported also Thaksin’s denounce of Privy Council President Prem 
Tinsulanonda as the mastermind of the military coup and the instigator of 
the Abhisit administration.17 The crisis further escalated in the Spring 2010, 
when the Army violently suppressed large demonstrations in Bangkok 
killing 90 protesters and injuring several hundreds.18  
New political elections were held in July 2011. Once again it was 
Thaksin-sponsored party, this time called Pheu Thai, to win an absolute 
majority.19 The new Prime Minister became his younger sister Yingluck 
Shinawatra. Political unrest was momentarily subdued due to the worst 
floods to hit several parts of the country in fifty years. In November 2013 
demonstrations resumed with the aim to oust Premier Yingluck. On 7 May 
2014 Yingluck and nine ministers were removed by a ruling of the 
Constitutional Court.20 Few days after the Army declared martial law and 
                                                             
13 ‘Thaksin ally wins Thai election’, BBC News, 23 December 2007. 
14 ‘Ousting the prime minister’, The Economist, 2 December 2008 
15 ‘New Thai prime minister elected’, BBC News, 15 December 2008. 
16 ‘Question loom over new Prime Minister's legitimacy’, The Nation, 17 
December 2008 
17 ‘Thai protesters bring Bangkok to a halt’, The Telegraph, 9 April 2009. 
18 ‘Rights group criticises “interfering” Thai army chief’, BBC News, 23 August 
2012. 
19 ‘Thaksin party wins Thai election by a landslide’, Reuters, 3 July 2011. 
20 ‘Yingluck removed, Niwatthamrong acting PM’, Bangkok Post, 7 May 2014. 
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then appointed a new government presided by General Prayuth Chan-o-
cha.21 
The protracted crisis, with an implacable clash between contraposed 
parts, explains why the 2014 had overarching ambitions. Each election held 
since 2001 had been won overwhelmingly by Thaksin and his allies. A 
military coup in 2006, mass demonstrations, and repeated interventions of 
the Constitutional Court against elected governments had not succeeded in 
reducing the popular consensus of the self-exiled former Premier. 
Furthermore, the confrontation also directly involved the Palace, with 
Thaksin openly accusing the Privy Council of unjustifiable interferences. 
With revered King Bhumibol in frail health conditions and a delicate royal 
transition ahead, the Army choose to adopt bolder steps than it had taken 
in 2006. 
The adoption of a new constitution in 2017 created an institutional 
framework able to harness the democratic process by various means, 
including assigning key powers to the Senate, the Constitutional Court and 
other institutions directly referring to, and appointed by, the Monarchy. For 
the political parties loyal to the Army (and the Palace) would be enough to 
get 25 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives as the unelected 
Senate will participate in the selection of the new Prime Minister and the 
new government. Furthermore, a binding 20-year economic strategy 
adopted by the junta will constraint the future elected government.22 
The adoption of the last pieces of legislation, such as the Election Bill, 
needed to allow new elections was completed in the first months of 2018 
by the Army-appointed Legislative Assembly, although the process was 
intentionally protracted to buy time for the junta.23  
The constitutional reform did not merely represent a change of the 
legal framework: it promoted a different vision of the democratic process, 
aiming at creating the consensus of the middle classes for an authoritarian 
political system. Redistributive policies favouring the working masses 
were presented as a vote-buying that corrupted the electoral democracy: 
«elections themselves become a corrupt practice, one that favours populist 
leaders who, through policies, gain popular support without necessarily 
producing “good governance”».24 Technocratic institutions were presented 
as a better and less corrupted alternative. In the Thai contest, the moral 
                                                             
21 ‘Thailand military seizes power in coup’, BBC News, 22 May 2014; ‘Coup 
leader General Prayuth is Thailand's new PM’, Southeast Asia Post, 22 August 2014. 
22 See Pietro P. Masina, ‘Thailand 2017: Political stability and democratic crisis 
in the first year of King Vajiralongkorn’, Asia Maior 2017. 
23 ‘Thailand election could be delayed to 2019’, The Nation, 21 January 2018. 
24 Claudio Sopranzetti, ‘Southeast Asia’s middle classes and the spectre of 
authoritarianism’, New Mandala, 27 March 2018. 
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superiority of a technocratic form of government «was translated by 
conservative political ideologues as thammarat, the governance 
of Dhamma, transforming good governance into righteous governance, a 
governance that does not rely on electoral support but rather on alignment 
with the monarch, the thammaraja».25 The idea that poor and uneducated 
peasants could easily be manipulated, voiding the democratic process of its 
fundamental legitimacy, had in fact been quite present in the Thai political 
debate for decades. However, the post-2014 coup authoritarian discourse 
allowed the elite to take one step further in advocating to itself the right to 
lead the country. The new Constitution, in sum, was part of a wider 
ideological project aiming at a «system of elite rule with elections».26 
 
 
2.2. Political repression and new parties 
 
The second objective to be reached by the junta was securing 
favourable conditions for maintaining the power after parliamentary 
elections. The constitutional reform and the new electoral system favouring 
smaller parties was an important prerequisite, which was achieved in early 
20017. The next step was the formation of a party under whose banners 
candidates close to the Army could participate in the elections. This party 
was established in March 2018 as Palang Pracharath (People’s State 
Power) by cronies of Premier Prayuth.27 Although other smaller parties 
expressed their support for Prayuth as a possible post-elections civilian 
Prime Minister, the Palang Pracharath became the official pro-junta party 
as it had among its leaders several junta cabinet members and advisers.28 
The new party become also an instrument of the junta to expand its 
consensus through the co-optation of provincial bosses with local influence 
as well as politicians previously connected with the Thaksin network or the 
Red Shirts movement.29 By the end of November 2018 up to 150 former 
MPs had joined the Palang Pracharath, among which a large number were 
ex Thaksin supporters and several came from the Democrat Party.30 The 
                                                             
25 Ibid. 
26 Michael H. Nelson, ‘Authoritarian Constitution-Making in Thailand, 2015-16: 
Elite (aphichon) Capture Turns a «Dual Polity» into a «System of Elite Rule with 
Elections», or a «Thai-style Authoritarianism»’, Southeast Asia Research Centre 
(SEARC), Working Paper Series No. 188, 2016. 
27 ‘New Party Wants to Recruit Prayuth’, Khaosod English, 12 March 2018. 
28 ‘PM allows ministers to back parties’, Bangkok Post, 26 September 2018. 
29 Prajak Kongkirati, ‘Why Thailand’s generals fail to co-opt elections’, New 
Mandala, 15 January 2019. 
30 ‘150+ Politicos Defect to New Pro-Junta Party’, Khaosod English, 27 
November 2018. 
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party become very popular also among the economic elites as witnessed by 
the success of its fundraising campaign: a lavish banquet hosted by the 
party leader, the Industry Minister Uttama Savanayana, on 19 December 
was able to raise the record sum of 20 million dollars in one evening.31 
However, this fundraising initiative led the opposition to move two 
accusations to the junta. The first was that government officers had abused 
their functions to obtain financial support for the pro-regime party; the 
second was that entire event lacked transparency.32 
Among the accusations against the military government regarding 
conflict of interests and unfair support to the Palang Pracharath, notable 
was the «gerrymandering controversy» in which the junta was alleged to 
have delayed the design of electoral districts so that they could be devised 
to favour its sponsored party.33  
In preparation for a return to the ballots, the government also took 
steps to increase its support in poor areas in which Thaksin Shinawatra had 
long dominated. A new scheme – social welfare cards – was launched in 
October 2017 to provide 200-300 baht ($6.26-9.39) a month to those who 
earn less than 100,000 baht a year—some 11m people. The initiative 
proved popular among the rural populations as it targeted the poorest. The 
policy promoted by Yingluck Shinawatra to support poor farmers by 
buying rice at higher than market prices had in fact been criticised because 
it addressed only those who had some rice to sell and excluded the poorest 
families.34 Allegations, however, indicated that government officers used 
the welfare cards scheme to force recipients to join the Palang 
Pracharath.35 
 
With the creation of a pro-regime party in March, Premier Prayuth 
and other members of the cabinet began to tour the country to promote their 
political agenda. However, the government maintained its ban on political 
activities until September, when some restrictions were eased.36 Only in 
December it allowed key activities such as assembling and fundraising – 
                                                             
31 ‘Thailand's new pro-junta party raises $20m in one night’, Nikkei Asian Review, 
27 December 2018. 
32 ‘Bellies full, but who paid?’, The Nation, 21 December 2018. 
33 ‘New EC boundary ruling under fire’, Bangkok Post, 18 November 2018; ‘EC 
under microscope for gerrymandering over designing of boundaries’, The Nation, 23 
November 2018. 
34 ‘Thailand’s heartland is surprisingly keen on the military junta’. The Economist, 
18 January 2018. 
35 ‘EC to speed up poll breach probes’, Bangkok Post, 25 December 2018. 
36 ‘Thailand’s junta eases politics ban in step toward polls’, Associated Press, 14 
September 2018. 
Thailand 2018 
 219 
but even then, the government still avoided setting a firm date for elections 
and barred the beginning of a real electoral campaign.37 
 
Notwithstanding the restrictions still imposed by the junta, in the 
Spring 2018 the opposition tried to resume its work after four years of hard 
repression. In mid-May, the opposition Pheu Thai Party called a press 
conference, denouncing the delays in holding new elections and criticizing 
the junta for its failure to keep its promises. This press conference had a 
strong echo at home and abroad. In response the junta filed a complaint 
with the police against the PTP: five senior members were charged with 
violating the ban on political activities and three more with sedition.38  
The level of popular support that the Pheu Thai Party was still able to 
command after four years of military dictatorship was difficult to predict 
for all the concerned parties. The new electoral system was explicitly 
devised to undermine the grip that Thaksin Shinawatra had exerted in the 
Northern regions, allowing his parties – the Thai Rak Thai, then the 
People’s Power and finally the Pheu Thai – to win the majority of seats in 
those areas. After years of harsh repression of the Red Shirts movement, 
aiming at disarticulating its leadership and frightening its militants,39 the 
new tactic to attract former Pheu Thai MPs also represented a challenge for 
the 2019 general elections. The Pheu Thai leadership, however, remained 
confident as the party continued to be seen as the strongest opponent to the 
military regime.40 
 
The Spring 2018 saw the attempt to reorganize also the oldest Thai 
party – the Democrat – which had been the main contender for the Pheu 
Thai before the military coup. Although the Democrat had officially 
condemned the junta for the suppression of civil liberties, many of its 
exponents were in fact in favor of the military intervention that had 
removed from power Thaksin’s sister and some openly supported Prayuth 
as post-elections Prime Minister.41 Primary elections in early November, 
however, confirmed the leadership of Abhisit Vejjajiva and a platform of 
                                                             
37 ‘Thailand lifts ban on political activity as election approaches’, The Straits 
Times, 12 December 2018. 
38 Neil Thompson, ‘Thailand's Junta Cracks Down on Thaksin's Pheu Thai Party’, 
The Diplomat, 23 May 2018; ‘Thailand’s military government targets opposition for 
criticising election delays’, South China Morning Post, 18 May 2018. 
39 Claudio Sopranzetti, ‘Southeast Asia’s middle classes and the spectre of 
authoritarianism’, cit. 
40 ‘Rising from the dead: Shinawatras’ Pheu Thai Party registers members for 
2019 elections’, South China Morning Post, 20 July 2018. 
41 ‘Does it matter who leads the Democrat Party?’, The Nation, 15 October 2018. 
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not commitment for the participation to future coalitions.42 Abhisit’s line 
was to verify after the election which majority could be expressed by the 
lower house and, eventually, if suitable conditions existed, «join a 
government that we feel will take the country in the right direction».43 
Given the bitter contrasts that had opposed the Democrats to the Pheu Thai, 
including the violent repression of the Red Shirts movement by the Abhisit 
cabinet in 2010, the likelihood of a coalition between these two parties 
appeared quite low. Not to be excluded, instead, that the Democrats could 
join forces with the pro-junta Palang Pracharath, although the 
characteristics and the leadership of such a government would depend on 
the election results. 
  
A new contender – possibly an ally for the Pheu Thai Party after the 
elections – emerged in March after the electoral commission allowed new 
parties to register for the first time in five years. The new Future Forward 
was funded by the young and charismatic Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, 
a left-wing oriented billionaire, whose fortune was connected to the 
automotive sector. This party was expected by many observers to have an 
appeal among the educated, urban youth.44  
When the 39-year-old Thanathorn announced his intention to step 
aside from the business world and commit himself full-time to politics, he 
was candid on the possibility that he and his party may face retaliation from 
the military junta. Few months later these fears become concrete when the 
police charged 5 Future Forward leaders with violating the computer crime 
law, which could result in five-year prison terms.45 
Repression of dissent had been a hallmark for the junta since it took 
power in May 2014, with the Red Shirts as the main target.46 Political 
repression continued in 2018, but with some changes. In the previous years 
all political activities were banned as well as the gathering of more than 
five persons. Opposition political leaders and activists were systematically 
intimidated, often detained, sometimes condemned to lengthy prison terms 
under spurious accusations.47 In the year ahead of general elections 
                                                             
42 ‘What's next for the Democrat Party?’, Bangkok Post, 17 November 2018.  
43 ‘Thai Democrats open to coalition that moves «in right direction»’, Nikkei 
Asian Review, 26 December 2018. 
44 ‘«I might go to jail tomorrow» – Thai tycoon takes on junta’, The Guardian, 1 
April 2018. 
45 ‘Founders of Thailand’s newest political party charged with computer crime’, 
South China Morning Post, 23 August 2018. 
46 Kevin Hewison, ‘Thai junta’s election facade a political throwback’, East Asia 
Forum, 22 April 2018. 
47 Pietro P. Masina, ‘Thailand 2017: Political stability and democratic crisis in the 
first year of King Vajiralongkorn’. 
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intimidation and threatening continued, but political trials became less 
frequent. As we will discuss in the following paragraph, the junta had 
previously used the Thai draconian lèse-majesté law – which punish those 
who insult the King or the heir to the throne with up to 15 years in jail – to 
silence the opposition, but in 2018 no one was persecuted on the basis of 
this law.48 However, authoritarianism continued to inform the way in which 
the junta prepared the country to the general elections be the held early in 
the following year. Political parties continued to be restricted in their 
operations until late in the year and then arbitrary rules were adopted.49  
Although less frequent than in the previous four years a number of 
incidents demonstrated that the regime continued to rely on discretionary 
use of the law to silence dissent. A prominent case was the prosecution of 
39 pro-democracy activists after they had peacefully protested military rule 
at a rally in Bangkok on 27 January. Seven of them faced charges of 
sedition and, if convicted, risking up to seven years in prison.50 
Another notable case occurred in October, when the son of former 
Premier Thaksin Shinawatra was indicated of money laundering and then 
granted bail of 1 million baht (S$41,909).51 Although the business activities 
of the family had been less than transparent, those more sympathetic with 
Thaksin saw this as yet another case of politically motivated accusations.  
The most surprising judiciary case regarded at the beginning of the 
year nine former leaders of the royalist Yellow Shirts movements for anti-
government protests in 2013 and 2014 – against the Administration led by 
Yingluck Shinawatra. Among those charged was Suthep Taugsuban, a 
former Democrat Vice premier under Abhisit. The same Suthep eventually 
became a support of the military junta and then created a pro-Prayuth 
faction within the Democrat Party.52 
 
 
2.3. Completing the monarchic transition 
 
At the time of the coup, King Bhumibol – who had reigned for 70 
years and was seen by many has the symbol of national unity – was ill and 
                                                             
48 Kevin Hewison, ‘Another year of military dictatorship in Thailand’, East Asia 
Forum, 18 December 2018. 
49 ‘Thailand “not free” since coup’, Bangkok Post, 13 April 2018. 
50 ‘Thailand: 39 Democracy Activists Charged’, Human Right Watch, 2 February 
2018. 
51 ‘Thai court grants bail to son of former PM Thaksin in money laundering case’, 
The Straits Times, 11 October 2018.  
52 ‘Thailand charges nine in anti-government protests dating to 2013’, Reuters, 24 
January 2018. 
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frail. Although there was no doubt on the possible succession, the Crown 
Prince Vajiralongkorn did not command the same popularity of his father 
and even within the Palace there was fear that he may not be up to the task.53 
However, after the death of his father and his ascent to the throne in 
December 2016, Maha Vajiralongkorn proved rapidly able to consolidate 
his position through a series of bold initiatives. At the time of the solemn 
cremation of late King Bhumibol, in October 2017, the new King 
Vajiralongkorn was firmly established in his power. The last step in the 
royal succession – the ceremony for the coronation – was expected to take 
place in mid 2019. 
In 2018 King Vajiralongkorn continued to consolidate his power and 
at the same time tried to promote himself as a benign monarch. The palace 
and the junta cooperated in the promotion of several public events 
sponsored by the king. In a bike ride led by the king, participants donned 
free shirts designed by Vajiralongkorn himself.54 Furthermore, the junta 
and palace sanctioned the creation of an official royal support group, 
known as Volunteer Spirit, which reportedly has some four million 
members.55  
Probably part of this goodwill campaign in the year ahead of the royal 
coronation was the sudden halt in lèse-majesté charges in 2018. After the 
2014 coup the junta routinely justified political repression using section 
112 of the criminal code that prescribes jail terms of up to 15 years for each 
count of offending the king, queen, heir or regent: at least 94 people were 
prosecuted for lèse-majesté and as many as 43 were sentenced.56 The lack 
of new prosecution in 2018 and the dismissal of ongoing cases may suggest 
that the junta felt strong enough not to need to use such drastic measures. 
Likely it also reflected the explicit will of King Vajiralongkorn not to 
tarnish his reign ahead of coronation.57 
A prominent case regarded the pro-Red Shirts publisher Somyot 
Prueksakasemsuk who had been condemned to a 10-year jail term in 2013. 
His sentenced was reduced by the Supreme Court in 2017 and he was 
released from prison in April 2018.58 A direct intervention of King 
Vajiralongkorn was decisive in dropping the charges against the elderly 
                                                             
53 Pietro P. Masina, ‘Thailand 2016: The death of King Bhumibol and the 
deepening of the political crisis’, Asia Maior 2016. 
54 Kevin Hewison, ‘Another year of military dictatorship in Thailand’. 
55 Ibid. 
56 ‘Thailand frees former magazine editor jailed for royal insult’, Reuters, 30 April 
2018. 
57 Kevin Hewison, ‘Another year of military dictatorship in Thailand’. 
58 ‘Thailand frees former magazine editor jailed for royal insult’; ‘Thailand can 
do without lese majeste statute’, The Nation, 1 May 2018. 
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scholar Sulak Sivaraksa, who opposed the military junta but remained a 
radical royalist.59 According to Sulak, who was interviewed after he had an 
audience with the king, Vajiralongkorn had sent a written message to the 
Supreme Court and the Attorney General instructing them no to file any 
charge of lèse-majesté without the consent of the palace.60 
 
Significant measures were adopted by the new King Vajiralongkorn 
in 2017 to establish personal control over the palace administration and 
royal finances.61 New steps were taken during the year in review, in 
particular asserting direct ownership of the assets previously administered 
by the Crown Property Bureau and estimated to amount to US$30 billion. 
In a statement in June 2018 the Crown Property Bureau said that it was 
required «to return whatever asset of the Crown property previously under 
its charge, to His Majesty so that His Majesty may take decisions on all 
matters pertaining to their charge and management at his discretion».62  
Crucially, the ascent to the throne of a new king involved a 
reassessment of that symbiotic relationship between the monarchy and 
military that has characterized much of recent Thai history.63 While in 2018 
Vajiralongkorn continued to consolidate his power in various directions – 
from new appointments to the Privy Council to quadrupling police force 
protecting the royal house64 – there was no hint to suggest that this 
symbiotic relationship was at stake. On the contrary, the palace continued 
to secure royal legitimacy to the military junta in the difficult preparation 
of political elections which were meant to further consolidate the power of 
Prayuth and his allies. At the same time, in September 2019 the 
appointment of General Apirat Kongsompong as the new chief of the Thai 
army seemed to be a further sign of the strengthening of the relationship 
between the king and the military. General Apirat, considered to be a close 
ally of the junta leader Prayuth, belonged to the King's Guard faction in the 
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First Infantry Division of the First Army Region – a group at the very heart 
of the royalist military establishment.65  
 
 
3. Navigating difficult waters: balancing the relations with China and 
the United States 
 
      During the Cold War, Thailand was considered one of the US 
closest allies. As China started to re-establish its regional prominence and 
became the Kingdom’s largest economic partner, Bangkok had to 
rebalance its relations. This realignment had been already in place for 
several years when the 2014 coup complicated the interaction with the 
Obama Administration.66 Strained relations with the US and the European 
Union further motivated the military government to intensify the 
interaction with China, while not renouncing to try to maintain a balance 
among major partners. A breakthrough for the junta in 2017 was the 
Premier Prayuth’s invitation to Washington by President Trump – against 
the custom for which military dictators are not invited to the White House.67 
The year 2018 did not see any significant change in the Bangkok’s 
relationship with its two main partners: military cooperation with the US 
returned to the pre-coup levels, but economic exchanges continued to tilt 
the balance towards closer integration with China. 
In February 2018, Washington decided to send to the Cobra Gold – 
Asia’s largest multilateral military exercise, hosted by Thailand – the 
biggest force since the 2014 coup. The strong American presence was not 
even abated by Bangkok’s invitation of the Myanmar Army, which was 
accused of ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya.68 Later in the year, the 
appointment of Gen. Apirat Kongsompong as the new Thailand’s army 
chief was also seen by some as a sign that the Kingdom aimed at closer 
relations with Washington as he was considered staunchly pro-American.69 
Even in the field of military cooperation, however, Bangkok continued to 
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play on both sides, purchasing Chinese weapons and discussing plans for 
joint facilities in Thailand to manufacture and repair armaments.70  
In a country highly polarized on most policy issues, foreign relations 
under the military government were substantially consistent with the line 
adopted by the previous administrations. In an interview for the Time, 
Prime Minister Prayuth was quite candid in reporting that Washington was 
an important ally but China was the «partner number one».71 The words of 
the retired general, however, reflected more the evidence of the stronger 
role of China as an economic partner than a strategic policy choice. The 
attempt to resist an excessive Chinese influence was particularly notable in 
the very slow construction of the China-Thailand railway, an 873-kilometer 
high-speed line projected to link Thailand’s east coast ports and industrial 
zones to China’s southern city of Kunming traveling through neighboring 
Laos. The project, considered to be one of the most important components 
of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, saw in 2018 only a very modest 
development, while the Thai government gave priority to infrastructures in 
and around Bangkok.72  
 
 
4. Economy: the Easter Economic Corridor and the CPTPP 
 
Once projected to be part of an East Asian Miracle, Thailand has 
never resumed pre-1997 regional crisis’ growth rates. Since the 2010s the 
country is often presented as stacked in a so-called «middle-income trap», 
which contributed to aggravate its lasting political crisis.73 To address this 
trap the military junta launched a series of initiatives under the brand of 
Thailand 4.0, aiming at taking the kingdom’s industries up the value-added 
ladder by luring investment into ten designated higher-tech sectors. The 
last piece of this wider strategy – the US$43 billion Eastern Economic 
Corridor (EEC) – was approved by the National Legislative Assembly in 
February 2018.74 The new law provides tax breaks for investors in the EEC 
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project and target investment into hi-tech industries. It also enables 
investors to rent land for up to 99 years.75 
The idea behind the EEC was to replicate the success of Thailand's 
first-generation Eastern Seaboard development in the 1980s. The Eastern 
Seaboard was developed by the military government of Gen Prem 
Tinsulanonda and became the lynchpin for Thai export-led growth for more 
than a decade prior to the 1997-98 economic crisis.76 The six priority 
infrastructure projects included a 220 kilometre high-speed airport rail 
linking U-Tapao Airport in Rayong province to the two airports serving 
Bangkok (Suvarnabhumi and Don Mueang); the modernization of U-Tapao 
Airport; a maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) facility at U-Tapao; 
the expansion of Laem Chabang Port and Map Ta Phut Port; and 
construction of a «Digital Park» in Chonburi.77 Chinese investments were 
particularly targeted for the EEC development.78 
 
In preparation for the next general election, the military government 
took another important decision: it decided to bring Thailand within the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).79 
Thailand had not participated in the negotiation for the US-led Trans-
Pacific Partnership agreement. The TPP was eventually transformed into a 
CPTPP when 11 nations decided to resume the project after Trump had 
announced that the US would not become part of the deal. The government 
justified its policy change indicating that the new trade pact was more 
flexible in crucial areas for Thailand such as medicine patents.80 Concerns 
remained among different stakeholders, particularly regarding agriculture, 
but the government estimate was that advantages would compensate 
losses.81 The official demand for joining the CPTPP was expected to be 
formulated in early 2019, before the elections. 
 
The Credit Suisse Global Wealth Databook 2018 listed the Kingdom 
as the country with the largest – and rising – inequality: in 2016, the 1% 
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richest Thais (500,000 people) owned 58.0% of the country’s wealth, while 
in 2018, they controlled 66.9%.82 While the World Bank estimates that the 
national Gini Index is in line with other countries at the same level of 
development, it also recognises that inequality remains very high.83 The 
military government, whose main supporter is the national elite, was unable 
and unwilling to address the problem. A draft proposal for a mild 
inheritance law was abandoned soon after the coup. A so-called Land and 
Building Tax was approved in November 2018,84 but only after several 
revisions had watered down its redistributive effects to preserve the 
interests of rich land owners.85 A 2 percent increase in minimum wage – 
the first since 2013 – was not expected to have a major impact in reducing 
inequality.86 
 
 
5. Society: social reforms and long-term concerns 
 
Two progressive initiatives were taken in Thailand in 2018, which 
contrasts with the typical image of a country under a repressive military 
rule. The first was the permission of marijuana for medical purposes.87 The 
second was the government approval of a bill for the recognition of same-
sex civil partnerships. If confirmed by the parliament after the general 
elections, Thailand would become the first country in the region to approve 
a similar legislation. Some activists opposed the bill due to limitations in 
the rights it would offer, while others welcomed it as a step towards 
marriage equality.88 The country is generally considered to be relatively 
friendly towards LGTB people, but a recent World Bank report suggested 
that there are still high levels of discrimination, especially in jobs and 
housing.89 
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More complex proved to tackled a long-standing problem for which 
Thailand had been singled out by both the US and the European Union: the 
treatment of workers in the fishing industry.90 In 2018 Thailand was the 
first country in the region to ratify the ILO Convention on Work in Fishing 
(No 188), but strong concerns remained regarding implementation 
especially for what regarded immigrant workers who still often face 
slavery-like conditions.91 
 
The most prominent news in international media on Thailand in 2018 
regarded the rescue of 12 teenage football players and their coach who had 
remained trapped inside Chiang Rai’s Tham Luang Nang Non cave on 23 
June. The rescue operation was quite complex. It involved over 1,000 
people, including a large number of foreign experts and not only attracted 
large international coverage but became very relevant in national politics.92 
The successful saving of the football team was a boost for the junta 
legitimation in a moment of national unit. The teenagers, and particularly 
the young coach, were hailed as national heroes for their bravery. However, 
the event ironically also exposed the condition of statelessness and 
marginalization affecting almost half million people of migrant descent, 
among which were three of the rescued kids and their coach.93 The lack of 
citizenship had deprived them of some basic rights and benefits, including 
the right to travel outside of the northern Chiang Rai province – home to 
ethnic minorities with roots in neighbouring Myanmar. Although the 
rescued teenagers were eventually granted citizenship, the national 
problem remained.94 
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